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THE ANTITRUST VISION AND ITS REVISIONIST CRITICS
WALTER ADAMS*
JAMES W. BROCK**

The central challenge to a free society is to construct an organizational
framework-a governance structure-to deal with both political and
economic power. Who shall make what decisions? At whose cost and for
whose benefit? To whom shall decision makers be accountable? What
mechanism shall be put in place to encourage "right" decisions and to
correct "wrong" decisions? Above all, how is individual freedom to be
reconciled with the general welfare? How is the state to be made strong
enough to protect its citizens and yet not powerful enough to enslave

them?
I. THE RATIONALE OF ANTITRUST

In the political realm, the founding fathers responded to this challenge

by incorporating the core principle of decentralized power in the United
States Constitution.' As good eighteenth-century republicans, students of
Locke and Montesquieu, combining a faith in the Enlightenment with their
experience as colonial subjects, they sought to produce a document

squarely based on popular sovereignty and opposition to arbitrary rule.
Aware of man's shortcomings-his inordinate greed and insatiable lust for
power-and believing that it was impossible to reform human nature, they
concluded that vice could not be controlled by virtue, but that it was
necessary to oppose one vice and interest with another vice and interest
Therefore, they wanted to design a nation that would check interest with
interest, faction with faction, class with class, and one governmental branch
with another. Their master plan was to construct a system of checks and
* Distinguished University Professor and Past President, Michigan State University;
Vernon F. Taylor Distinguished Visiting Professor, Trinity University; B.A., Brooklyn
College; M.A., Yale University; Ph.D., Yale University; member, Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1953-55).
** Bill R. Moeckel Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Miami
University (Ohio); B.S., University of Wyoming; M.S., University of Wyoming; Ph.D.,
Michigan State University.
1. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 335-37 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed.
1961); W. LIPPMANN, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GOOD SoCIETY (1937); H.
MORoENTHAU, THE PURPOSE OF AmEmucAN PoLrTcs (1960).
2. See D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 126
(1990) (summary of speech by Gouverneur Morris, Pennsylvania delegate to the
Constitutional Convention).
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balances, a Newtonian mechanism of countervailing powers, operating
harmoniously in mutual frustration. Their foremost goal was to prevent the
summum malum: the concentration of power and the abuses that flow from
it.
Thomas Jefferson, in particular, objected to the concentration of all
governmental powers-legislative, executive, and judicial-in a single
legislative body in his native Virginia. 3 To him, concentrating these
powers in the same hands was precisely what despotic government was all
about. The fact that these powers would be exercised by a legislature,
popularly elected by majority vote, consisting perhaps of "upright" and
decent men, made little difference.' "An elective despotism," he said, "was
not the government we fought for ......
The principles of liberty, he
believed, required a system "in which the powers of government should be
so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no
one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked
and restrained by the others."" In his Notes on the State of Virginia,
Jefferson urged his colleagues to
look forward to a time, and not a distant one, when a corruption
in this, as in the country from which we derive our origin, will
have seized the heads of government, and be spread by them
through the body of the people; when they will purchase the
voices of the people, and make them pay the price.
The structure of the system, he said, was more important than the personal
integrity of the individuals who exercised power under it, and the "time to
guard against corruption and tyranny, is before they shall have gotten hold
of us. It is better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to drawing
his teeth and talons after he shall have entered." 8
Antitrust is inspired by the same philosophical precepts. It prescribes
a central governance system for the economy which is also based on the
principle of decentralized decision making. HerQ, the free play of market
forces, not some central authority, is entrusted with the power to determine
the kinds and quantities of goods to be produced, the factors of production
to be employed, and the division of distributive shares. Here, individual

3. T. JEFFERsON, Notes on the State of Virginia, in WRITINGS 123,245-46 (M. Peterson
ed. 1984).
4. Id. at 246.
5. Id at 245 (emphasis omitted).

6. Id
7. Id at 246.

8. Id
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activity is to be coordinated through an autonomous and impartial planning
mechanism free of human control, manipulation, or perversion. Here,
competitive market forces are to harness the individual appetite for private
gain to social ends. Here, society grants individuals the privilege of
economic freedom because the competitive market imposes the checks and
balances to constrain that freedom in the public interest.
The governance system imposed by the competitive market, of course,
is neither natural nor immutable. Like any human artifact, it must be
nurtured and protected from erosion and subversion. And that is the role
of antitrust. Like the political system prescribed by our Constitution, it
calls for a dispersion of power, buttressed by built-in checks and balances,
to protect individuals from potential abuse of power and to preserve not
only individual freedom but, more importantly, a free system. According
to antitrust precepts-to paraphrase Justice William 0. Douglas-power that
controls the economy should not be in the hands of an industrial
oligarchy.9 Since all power tends to develop into a government in itself,
industrial power should be decentralized. It should be scattered into many
hands so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the
whims or caprice, the political prejudices, and the emotional stability of a
few self-appointed individuals. The fact that they are not vicious, but
respectable and social-minded, is irrelevant. That is the philosophy and the
command of the antitrust laws. They are founded on a theory hostile to
private individuals amassing a power so great that even a government of
the people can be trusted with it only in exceptional circumstances.
II. THE REVISIONIST CRITIQUE OF ANTITRUST
This view of antitrust has recently come under attack. A group of
revisionist theorists, variously identified with the Chicago School and the
New Learning, and spearheaded by Robert Bork, has rejected the
"structuralist" interpretation of antitrust and embraced a policy of radical
laissez-faire.1" As propounded by Robert Bork, its most articulate

9. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (Douglas, J.,

dissenting).
10. See, e.g., Authorization, Legislation and Oversight of the U.S. Department of
Justice: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-11
(1988) (statement of Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust,
Department of Justice); F.T.C. TRANSITION REPORT, reprintedin 126 CONG. REc. 21,349
(1981); W. BAUMOL, J.PANZAR & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); Y. BROZEN, CONCENTRATION, MERGERS, AND PUBLIC

POLICY (1982); INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H.
Mann & J.Weston eds. 1974); J. MCGEE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988); R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Becker, Antitrust's Only Proper

Quarry: Collusion, Bus. WK., Oct. 12, 1987, at 22; Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust, 84
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exponent, the New Learning doctrine resurrects the nineteenth-century
belief in economic Darwinism," including an abiding faith that (with the
exception of price fixing) the "firm, in its own interests, will make the best
choice for consumers."12 To these it adds the assertions that the sole goal
of antitrust is the maximization of "consumer welfare;" 13 that "consumer
welfare" is synonymous with "economic efficiency;" 4 and that "economic
efficiency" is not susceptible to quantification or measurement but, instead,
can only be inferred from a firm's survival and growth (in the absence of
government intervention). 5

The implications for antitrust policy, especially merger policy, are

clear: horizontal mergers which increase economic concentration are not
necessarily objectionable. Indeed, they may be "prima facie evidence that
greater concentration . . . is socially desirable."16 Furthermore, since

vertical mergers do not combine direct competitors, interfering with them

obstructs "the creation of efficiency" and, therefore, "antitrust should never
object to the verticality of any merger. " " As regards conglomerate
mergers, "antitrust should never interfere with any conglomerate merger.
Like the vertical merger, the conglomerate merger does not put together
rivals .... [Clonglomerates do not threaten competition, and they may

MIcH. L. REV. 1696 (1986); Gatty,Antitrust Goal: 'Economic Rationality, " NATION'S Bus.,
Oct. 1981, at 59; Ginsburg & Robinson, The Case Against Federal Intervention in the
Market for Corporate Control, BROOKINGs REV., Winter-Spring 1986, at 9; Interview with
Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter: Merger Surge is a Test of Reagan Policy,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 3, 1981, at 51; Oliver, Luncheon Address, 55 ANTITRUST
L.J. 349 (1986); Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979); Reilly, Big Shift in Antitrust Policy, DUN'S REV., Aug. 1981, at 38; Smith, Why Not
Abolish Antitrust?, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 23; Taylor, A Talk with Antitrust Chief
William Baxter, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1982, at 28, col. 3.
11. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 117-18
(1978); see also W. ADAMS & J. BROCK, THE BIGNESs CoMPLEx 4-5, 25-30 (1986)
(discussing theories, Darwinian and otherwise, employed to rationalize concentrations of
economic power).
12. R. BORK, supra note 11, at 208.
13. Id at 66-72. According to Bork, "[tihe Sherman Act was clearly presented and
debated as a consumer welfare prescription." Id at 66. For insight into the revisionist view
of the purposes of antitrust, see Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and
the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413 (1990).
14. R. BORK, supra note 11, at 91. Bork states that "[t]he whole task of antitrust can
be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive
efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare." Id.
15. Id at 124-33.
16. Id at 205.
17. Id at 234, 245.
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contribute valuable efficiencies." 18 Imbued with faith in economic
Darwinism and the sanctity of industry structures, New Learning and
Chicago School faithfuls would permit horizontal mergers between direct
competitors accounting for as much as sixty to seventy percent of a
particular market. 9
Fabricated from tautological constructs, the New Learning begs the
core questions of economic power and antitrust. The apostles of the New
Learning monomaniacally insist upon the primacy of "consumer welfare"
and "efficiency" as the only "legitimate" goals of antitrust policy.2" They

incessantly demand that all antitrust issues be resolved solely in these

terms. But what do "consumer welfare" and "efficiency" mean in New
Learning doctrine? To what do they refer? How do they differ from their
everyday interpretation? In what context are they applied? What, in their
application, do they omit from consideration? With what consequences and
implications? Once these questions are examined, the New Learning
dissolves into a vacuous tautology.
From the assumption that consumers make choices in attempting to
maximize their individual well being, the New Learning leaps to the
doctrinaire conclusion that the existing pattern of consumer choices must
represent the highest possible level of consumer welfare.2 Because
18. Id. at 248.
19. Id.at 251. According to Bork, the law should strike only at those horizontal
mergers which create "very large market shares (those that leavefewer than three significant
rivals in the market)." Id at 406 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 55-66. For different views of congressional intent with respect to antitrust
policy, see Flynn, The Reagan AdministrationAntitrust Policy: "OriginalIntent" and the
Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 266-67 (1988)
(Congress's goal was "to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive
efficiency so greatly" as to impinge upon the maximization of wealth); Fox & Sullivan,
Antitrust Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We
Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 931, 970 (1987) (Congress sought to promote competition);
Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original andPrimary Concern ofAntitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.. 65, 65 (1982) (Congressional intent was to
further economic objectives of a "distributive rather than an efficiency nature").
21. See, e.g., D. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY 43 (1982) ("[rlesources are
not misallocated when they are allocated in accordance with revealed consumer preferences
in open markets"); R. BORK, supra note 11, at 105 ("[s]ince a free market system assumes
that consumers define their own welfare, it follows that productive efficiency consists in
offering anything, whether products or services, that consumers are willing to pay for"); R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (3d ed. 1986) ("[w]here resources are shifted
pursuant to a voluntary transaction, we can be reasonably sure that the shift involves an
increase in efficiency"); Bork, Panel Discussion, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE
MARKET SYsTEM: LEoAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PERsPECTIVES 155 (E. Fox
& J.Halverson eds. 1979) ("you have to take the consumer's word on the question of what
his welfare is, he buys the product because he wants it, and that is good enough for us");
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consumers maximize welfare, their welfare is presumed to be at a
maximum-regardless of how restricted the range of available options,
regardless of how unappealing, in an absolute sense, those options might
be, and regardless of the onerous external diseconomies of each available
option. What is chosen maximizes consumers' welfare. Why? Because it
is welfare maximizing to choose it!
For example, confronted with only large, expensive gas-guzzling
automobiles, the fact that consumers buy them would be taken by the New
Learning as proof that such cars maximize consumer welfare, even though
consumers might have chosen small, fuel-efficient autos if they had been
provided, and even though consumer welfare would have been greater as
a result. But, as Warren Samuels points out, the individual confronted with
a preordained range of options (i.e., choose any car so long as it is a big
gas-guzzler) is a choice taker, not a choice maker.' Under these
circumstances, consumer sovereignty is compromised and the regulatory
power of the market is vitiated.
The New Learning translates this circular reasoning into its canons of
"efficiency" in resource allocation. According to New Learning advocate
Robert Bork, for example, efficiency "is defined and measured in terms of
consumer welfare. Since a free market system assures that consumers
define their own welfare, it follows that productive efficiency consists in
offering anything, whether products or services, that consumers are willing
to pay for."'
Thus, the mere fact that offerings are purchased is,
according to New Learning doctrine, "proof" of efficient resource
utilization 2 --again, regardless of how narrow the actual range of products
available, regardless of the terms exacted for them, regardless of whether
consumers might have bought other products if available, and regardless
of whether the latter outcome would have resulted in a better, more
efficient use of society's resources. In other words, if the automobile
oligopoly produces only large, gas-guzzling cars and consumers buy them,
then, according to New Learning doctrine, production of large,
gas-guzzling cars represents the most "efficient" employment of society's
scarce resources. What is produced is efficient. Why? Because it is
efficient to produce it!

McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, in INDUSTRIAL

CONCENTRATION, supra note 10,
at 55, 91 ("[if markets are 'open' ... and consumers are free to accept what they regard
as the best offers going, there is a very strong presumption that the benefits from trade will

be as high as realistically can be").
22. Samuels, Welfare Economics,Power,andProperty, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY
61 (G. Wunderlich & W. Gibson eds. 1972).
23. R. BORK, supra note 11, at 104-05.

24. See id at 105.
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Hence, the circularity is complete: Whatever consumers choose is
"efficient," and whatever firms produce maximizes "consumer welfare."
If this were not so, different choices would be made. The fact that different
choices are not made "proves" that the actual choices reflect a "voluntary,"
"non-coerced," "consensus" optimum of "consumer welfare;" it "proves"
that the current allocation of resources reflects the maximum systemic
"efficiency." Buttressed by the concept of Pareto optimality, therefore,
the New Learning is not only tautological, but it begs important questions:
What choices would consumers have made if the opportunity set from
which they chose had been more expansive and more diverse? Would not
a different array of options lead to a differeiit pattern of consumer choices,
and greater consumer welfare? Would it not result in a different, more
efficient allocation of society's resources?
More fundamentally, the New Learning evades the essential questions
of political economy: Who determines the options from which consumers
are permitted to choose? Who thus governs the allocation of society's
resources? According to what criteria? With what consequences? For
whom? With whose consent? And with what assurance that the outcome
will be in the public interest?
Reflexively incanted, "consumer welfare" and "efficiency" are the
shibboleths with which the New Learning reads economic power out of the
picture-where economic power includes the capacity to influence the
options from which consumers will be permitted to choose, to manipulate
the cost of those options, and thus to govern the allocation of resources.
The New Learning fails to consider that concentrations of private economic
power will yield patterns of consumption and resource allocations different
from those that would be produced under competitive conditions. It fails
to recognize that a different private power structure will produce a different
array of consumer options, with different consumer choices, and a different
allocation of resources. Above all, it fails to consider that "voluntary"
choice within the confines of a restricted range of alternatives maximizes
neither consumer welfare nor allocative efficiency in any meaningful sense.
As a result, it falls victim to the sin of suboptimization.
In so doing, the New Learning sanctifies the status quo and the
existing pattern of private power. It legitimizes coercion, so long as it is
exerted by private power concentrates. Thus it is tantamount to defining
"consumer welfare" and "efficiency" as equivalent to whatever private
power can commandeer.

25. For a correct view of Pareto optimality, see Samuelson, Pure Theory of Public

Expenditures and Taxation, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS 98, 106-07 (J. Margolis & H. Guitton
eds. 1969) (stating that Pareto optimality cannot be arrived at by dealing with all interrelated
questions simultaneously because in reality problems do arise and social welfare functions
lead to different outcomes).
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As a putative guide for antitrust policy, the New Learning fails to ask
the relevant question of whether less concentration and more independent
centers of initiative are more likely, in practice, to produce better economic
performance. It fails to consider whether the competitively structured
market, with a multiplicity of rivals, is more likely to expand the range of
options from which consumers can choose, to foster experimentation and
innovation in new products, to promote greater consumer welfare, and to
result in better resource allocation and use. It fails to consider that mergers
and concentration reduce the number of suppliers of options to consumers,
narrow the range from which consumers can choose, and thereby
jeopardize consumer welfare and efficiency. It fails to consider that
merger-induced corporate concentration creates powerful bigness
complexes able to manipulate consumer options and resource
allocations-without any assurance that the exercise of such discretion will
promote society's best interest.
In sum, the fatal flaw of the New Learning is that it rules out
consideration of the core concern of antitrust-the problem of economic
power in a free-enterprise economy. It mistakes means for ends and tools
for truth.
III. THE REVISIONIST VIEw: AN EMPICAL TEST
The American automobile industry affords an appropriate case study
for empirically testing the New Learning's claims. The industry is, and has
long been, a powerful triopoly of fins. The Big Three producers-General
Motors (GM), Ford, and Chrysler-traditionally have accounted for ninety
percent or more of America's automobile production and, until recently,
they collectively controlled an equivalent share of U.S. auto sales.26 They
rank as the first, third, and eleventh largest industrial corporations in the
United States,' and are the world's first, fourth, and twenty-seventh
largest manufacturers respectively." They employ 1.2 million workers,

26. See Adams & Brock, The Automobile Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERicAN
INDUsTRY 101, 104-07 (W. Adams ed. 1990). In 1989, GM, Ford, and Chrysler together
accounted for 83% of all U.S. automobile production, and 67% of all U.S. automobile sales.
AUTOMOTIVE NEws, 1990 MARKEr DATA BOOK 12, 27 (1990). These concentration
figures, however, are understated, because they exclude "captive imports (foreign-produced
automobiles imported by the Big Three under their own nameplates), and because they also
fail to take into account the extensive joint-venture ties between the Big Three and most of
their major foreign rivals.
27. The Fortune500: Largest U.S. IndustrialCorporations,FORTUNE, Apr. 22, 1991,
at 280, 286.
28. The Global 500: The World's Biggest IndustrialCorporations,FoRTUNE, July 29,
1991, at 244, 245.
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and had $260 billion in sales, assets of $385 billion, and combined profits
of $8.4 billion in 1989.29
These automotive giants are extensively integrated-horizontally,
vertically, internationally, and conglomerately. They assemble motor
vehicles at a multitude of locations across the country. They are vertically
integrated upstream, producing automotive parts and components in scores
of additional plants. They have vertically integrated downstream in recent
years, acquiring sizable ownership stakes in seven rental car firms
(including leaders Hertz and Avis)."° They are integrated internationally,
ranking among the largest motor vehicle manufacturers in a number of
nations around the globe and, during the 1980s, they have woven an
intricate web of joint-venture agreements with virtually all of their major
foreign rivals. 1 They are extensively diversified, especially GM, which
until recently controlled some 75% of U.S. bus production, 100% of
passenger locomotives, and 80% of freight locomotives.3 2 In the 1980s,
the Big Three unleashed major conglomerate acquisition campaigns,
including GM's $2.5 billion purchase of Electronic Data Systems (EDS),
and its $5 billion acquisition of Hughes Aircraft Company (a leading
defense contractor).3 Ford, through acquisitions, now ranks as the
nation's second-largest provider of financial services, and has purchased
New Holland farm equipment and BDM (a defense contracting firm), 3'
and Chrysler has acquired Gulfstream AerospEace for $628 million, along
with a number of financial service concerns.
Here, then, are corporate size and market power on an impressive
scale. But what are the consequences of absolute and relative firm size in
this major industry? How does it impact the options from which consumers
are free to choose? Have corporate size, industrial concentration, and
market power served to promote consumer welfare, as the New Learning
claims? Has it promoted efficiency in the allocation of society's resources?

29. Id.
30. See Patterson, Chrysler to Acquire DollarRent A Car,Eyeing Broader Market in
Rental Sector, Wall St. J., June 27, 1990, at A4, col. 2.
31. For a detailed analysis of this latter phenomenon and the anticompetitive problems
it poses, both in autos and more generally, see Adams & Brock, Joint Ventures, Antitrust,
and TransnationalCartelization, 11 Nw. L INT'L L. & BUs. 433 (1991).
32. The IndustrialReorganizationAct: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Antitrustand
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4A, at A-26
(1974) [hereinafter IndustrialReorganizationAct Hearings](statement of Bradford C. Snell,
Assistant Counsel to the Subcommittee).
33. MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., 1 MOODY'S INDusmIAL MANUAL 1233 (1989).
34. Clark, Benton Aims Fordat "Core" Business, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Apr. 30, 1990,
at 1, 40; Reiff, Slowing Traffic Ahead, FORBES, Apr. 30, 1990, at 82.
35. MooDY's INvESTORs SERv., supra note 33, at 1045.
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Has it effectuated a social optimum? The empirical evidence in four
important areas-urban transportation, fuel economy, automotive safety, and
smog control-is instructive.
A. Urban Transportation
Objectively considered, allocative efficiency in the nation's urban areas
calls for the combination of alternative transport modes (mass transit
railways, trolleys, buses, and private passenger cars) best capable of
moving masses of people quickly, comfortably, and economically, while
conserving scarce land and space.
In actuality, of course, urban transportation is overwhelmingly
dominated by the private automobile-a result that in many respects
represents the least efficient allocation of resources. As one expert points
out, the preeminence of the private car in America's cities produces
"congestion, pollution, and a growing sense of frustration. Where all-out
efforts have been made to accommodate the car, the streets are still
congested, commuting is increasingly difficult, urban aesthetics have
Former
suffered, and the quality of life has been eroded."36
Transportation Secretary Alan Boyd once observed that a description of a
city under wartime siege would differ little from that of a contemporary
American city during the daily rush hour. 7 Or as transportation specialist
John Burby calculated: "Traffic in downtown New York, which in 1906
crept along behind horses at an average speed of 11.5 miles an hour, was
by 1966 creeping along at 8.5 miles an hour behind the most powerful
engines Detroit could mass-produce."3 8
But the predominance of the private passenger car, and its untoward
economic impact upon urban environments, is not solely the result of
market supply passively responding to consumer preferences. Rather, the
automobile oligopoly generally, and GM in particular, acted to artificially
restrict the transportation options from which urban dwellers have been
permitted to choose.
As the nation's predominant producer of buses and automobiles, GM
understood, at an early date, that if urban railways could be effectively
eliminated as viable consumer options, the sales of its buses could be
vastly expanded. And if transit systems using buses could subsequently be
made to decline or fail, and urban consumers' choices further constricted,
a huge market would open up for additional sales of private automobiles.

36. W. OwEN, THE AccEssiBLE Crry 1 (1972).
37. H. LEAvriT, SUPERIuGHWAY-SUPERHOAX 13 (1970).
38. J. BURBY, THE GREAT AMERICAN MOTION SICKNESS OR WHY YOU CAN'T Gar"
THERE FROM HERE 4 (1971).
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Thus, according to the findings of a federal court (sustaining a
conviction for criminal conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws), 39 GM
was instrumental in organizing National City Lines, an operating company
that engineered the demise of forty-six electric mass transit systems in
forty-five cities in sixteen states.o Through its National City Lines

subsidiary, GM and its co-conspirators (a tire producer and an oil
company) gained control of urban rail transit systems, literally destroyed
them, and replaced them with GM buses.4 1
The consequences of the oligopoly's power to constrain consumers'
choices and to restrict their options can scarcely be construed as promoting
consumer welfare or social efficiency. Analyst Bradford C. Snell testified
before a congressional committee that prior to GM's formation of National
City Lines the Los Angeles area "was a beautiful region of lush palm trees,
fragrant orange groves, and clean, ocean-enriched air. It was served then
by the world's largest interurban electric railway system." 2 But, Snell
continued, in the late 1930s, General Motors and allied highway interests
purchased the local transit system, scrapped its electric transit
cars, tore down its power transmission lines, ripped up the tracks,
and placed GM diesel buses fueled by Standard Oil on Los
Angeles' crowded streets. In sum, GM and its auto-industrial allies
severed Los Angeles' regional rail links and then motorized its
downtown heart.
Motorization drastically altered the quality of life in southern
California. Today, Los Angeles is an ecological wasteland: The
palm trees are dying from petrochemical smog; the orange groves
have been paved over by 300 miles of freeways; the air is a septic
tank into which 4 million cars, half of them built by General
Motors, pump 13,000 tons of pollutants daily.43

39. United States v. Nat'l City Lines, 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1951).
40. Id. at 568.
41. Id. at 565-66. In addition, GM President Alfred Sloan organized the National
Highway Users Conference (NHUC) in 1932 "to combine representatives .of the Nation's
auto, oil, and tire industries in a common front against competing transportation interests."
Industrial Reorganization Act Hearings, supra note 32, at A-44 (statement of Bradford C.
Snell, Assistant Counsel to the Subcommittee). The organization's announced objectives
were dedication of gasoline taxes solely to highway purposes and the promulgation of an
ongoing program of highway construction. Its 2800 lobbying groups subsequently persuaded
more than forty states to create trust funds, and NHUC has repeatedly succeeded in
defeating efforts to use highway trust funds for alternative transport options. Id.
42. Industrial Reorganization Act Hearings, supra note 32, at A-31 (statement of
Bradford C. Snell, Assistant Counsel to the Subcommittee).
43. Id.
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Nor was the situation in Los Angeles unique.' More generally, after
examining the historical record, transportation expert George Smerk
concluded that street "railways and trolley bus operations, even if better
suited to traffic needs and the public interest, were doomed in favor of the
vehicles and material produced by the [National City Lines]
conspirators" 45-evidence scarcely indicative of social optimality or the
operation of an open, competitive market reflecting the free play of
consumer preference.
B. Fuel Efficiency and the Small Car
Because automobiles account for nearly half of the country's oil
consumption, the fuel efficiency, or inefficiency, of the Big Three's
automobiles exerts a decisive impact on America's consumption of
petroleum, its dependence on geopolitically volatile foreign oil supplies,
and the urgency and eventual success of its national energy policy. Has
oligopoloid size contributed to efficient resource allocation in these
respects? Hardly.
The Big Three refused for decades to make smaller, less expensive and
more fuel-efficient automobiles available to consumers, despite indications
of consumer interest in these options. In fact, as early as the 1940s, the
United Auto Workers urged Detroit to build small, fuel-efficient cars,
citing an opinion survey conducted by the Society of Automotive
Engineers indicating that sixty percent of the public favored this type of
automobile.47 Later, a committee of the National Academy of Engineering
found that a secular shift in consumer preferences toward small cars "was
evident long before OPEC quadrupled the price of crude oil" in the
1970s.4
Rather than respond to this consumer preference, however, the Big
Three withheld small, fuel-efficient cars from the American market, 49 and
effectively evaded the competitive market test of consumer choice. In

44. See id at A-32; see also infra note 77.
45. G. SMERK, URBAN TRANSPORTATION 50 (1965).
46. Flavin, Detroit: America's Best Source of Oil, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1990, § 3, at
13, col. 2.
47. Blumberg, Snarling Cars, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 24, 1983, at 12.
48. NAT'L ACADEMY OF ENG'G, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. AUTO
INDUSTRY 20 (1982).
49. However, it is significant that the American auto oligopoly was not averse to
making small, fuel-efficient automobiles available abroad. For example, a small, light-weight
car developed by GM was marketed in Australia in 1948 by a GM subsidiary, while Ford's
light car appeared the same year as the French Ford Vedette. See White, The American
Automobile Industry and the Small Car,1945-1970, 20 J. INDUs. ECON. 179, 181 (1972).
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1962, for example, Ford canceled the planned introduction of its Cardinal,
which featured a front-mounted, transverse, four-cylinder engine and frontwheel drive, similar to the GM X-cars, the Ford Escort, and the Chrysler
Omni introduced twenty years later.50
The noncompetitive mutual interdependence and oligopolistic groupthink characteristic of concentrated market structures seems to have played
a key role in the industry's refusal to supply smaller, more economical
automobiles. As brilliantly documented by economist Lawrence J. White,
GM, Ford and Chrysler each recognized that vigorous unilateral entry into
small car production would likely trigger entry into the field by the others
and, in turn, would undermine their group-monopoly profits on large cars:
Twice, one or two of the Big Three pulled back from plunging
ahead with a small car when the market did not look large enough
for all three.... A sizable niche might well have been carved out
at the bottom of the market by a Big Three producer in 1950, or
again, with a "subcompact" in 1962 or 1963. Room-for-all
considerations, however, appeared to rule this out.5"
On the basis of their behavior, White concludes that
the Big Three definitely recognized their mutual interdependence,
since in the absence of retaliation by rivals a single firm
contemplating the production of a small car should have expected
to gain more profits from stealing the dissatisfied customers from
other firms than he would lose from dissatisfied customers of his
own large cars.... [B]ut the Big Three mutually contemplating
a small
car could only see lost profits from reduced sales of large
52
cars.
Of course, the social ramifications of the industry's performance struck
home with a vengeance in the 1970s, when the nation was convulsed by
oil shortages, gasoline crises, mile-long service-station lines, and armed
service-station attendants. Yet, the industry continued to resist efforts to

50. NAT'L ACADEMY OF ENG'G, supra note 48, at 70. The industry's attitude was
summarized in a 1957 Fortune article: "If GM has said it once, it's said it ten thousand
times: 'A good used car is the answer to the American public's need for cheap
transportation.'" Sheehan, A Big Year for Small Cars, FORTUNE, Aug. 1957, at 105. "I
think there is something wrong with those people who buy small cars," a GM official
categorically declared. B. YATES, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE
INDUsTRY 34 (1983).
51. White, supra note 49, at 191.
52. IM.at 180.
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make more fuel-efficient cars available to consumers. Just months before
the first OPEC oil embargo in 1973, the chairman of GM pointed to

nuclear power as an important means for resolving what he denigrated as
the nation's energy "question. " 53 In 1979, one month before the
overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the onset of the nation's second oil
crisis in six years, GM's President Elliott M. (Pete) Estes assured the

public that automotive "fuel economy standards are not necessary and they
are not good for America."' In 1985, when government fuel-economy
standards once again began to constrain their decision-making power, the
auto giants capitalized on their economic size, and used the threat of
massive plant shutdowns and job layoffs to bludgeon Congress into
relaxing the mileage standards. 5 And in the midst of the 1990 IraqKuwait oil crisis, with automotive fuel economy actually declining over the
two-year period preceding it,56 the oligopoly continued to resist efforts to

53. Automotive Research and Development and Fuel Economy: HearingsBefore the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 564 (1973) [hereinafter Automotive
Research and Development Hearings] (statement of Richard C. Gerstenberg, Chairman,
General Motors Corp.).
54. E. CRAY, CHROME CoLossus 524 (1980).
55. Unless the fuel economy requirements were relaxed, a GM Vice-President warned
Congress, "full-line manufacturers [that is, GM and Ford], to achieve compliance, face the
prospect of restricting product availability ... ." Automobile Fuel Economy Standards:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Regulation and Conservation of the Senate
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1985) (statement of Dr.
Marina N. Whitman, Vice-President, Public Affairs, General Motors Corp.). This, she
pointedly noted for the benefit of Congress, "translates into plant closings, job losses, and
lower economic growth." Id Failure by Congress to accede to the industry's demands, she
repeated, "would mean inevitably fewer sales, closing some plants, putting people out of
work, slowing down the economy." Il at 81. To drive the point home, GM submitted an
extensive list of eighty-eight plants-with the city and state location of each conveniently
specified-that could be adversely affected should the Congress refuse to act. Id at 284-88.
Ford echoed GM's demands, despite evidence that the fines for failing to meet the
government fuel economy standards would amount to less than one percent of suggested
retail prices of the least fuel-efficient cars, and despite the fact that even the industryoriented National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) conceded that the auto
companies "may, to some extent, influence demand through their marketing and pricing
strategies." Id at 27 (statement of Diane K. Steed, Administrator, NHTSA).
Nevertheless, the industry's threats were crowned with success in July, 1985, when
NHTSA relaxed automotive fuel standards in accordance with the demands of GM and
Ford, citing adverse economic consequences, including "substantial sales losses for the
manufacturers and increased unemployment in the auto industry" if the standards were not
lowered. Stuart, U.S. Announces It Will Ease '86 Auto Fuel Economy Rule, N.Y. Times,
July 19, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
56. See Sullivan, It Wouldn't Be Easy, But U.S. Could Ease Reliance on Arab Oil,
Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1990, at A4, col. 2.
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boost auto fuel efficiency, thereby exacerbating America's continuing
dependence on unreliable foreign oil suppliesY7
The oligopoly's relative immunity from external control-indeed, its
considerable power to dictate social choices-seems clear. Whether this
promotes consumer welfare or a rational allocation of resources is, to say
the least, an open question.

Energy analyst Christopher Flavin pointed out that if "average [auto] fuel economy was
just five miles per gallon higher, we would be importing two million fewer barrels of oil
each day, and in a much better position to withstand the effects of the embargo on Iraq."
Flavin, supra note 46, at 13, col. 2. Yet at the height of the Iraq-Kuwait oil crisis, GM
introduced its Buick Roadmaster, "a 4,410-pound monster with a V-8 engine that gets
sixteen miles to the gallon in city driving." White & Templin, Gas PriceJump Finds Car
Makers Backsliding on Fuel Efficiency, Wall St. L, Sept. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
The industry defends its fuel-economy record by claiming that its attention has been
devoted to safety and pollution control achievements, which conflict with higher mileage.
Id. at A4, col. 3. But this defense is contradicted by the industry's traditional resistance to
safety and pollution improvements, see infra notes 58-82 and accompanying text, as well
as by the industry's backwardness in such innovations as multivalve engines, which pollute
less and achieve higher mileage, see infra note 103 and accompanying text. For example,
Honda's stratified-charge CVCC engine of the 1970s obtained higher mileage while being
less polluting (and without the need for complicated catalytic converters that the U.S.
oligopoly eventually adopted to reduce automotive emissions). B. YATEs, supra note 50, at
168.
More generally, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration was able, during
the 1970s, to design and build experimental automobiles which obtained 32 to 50 miles per
gallon, yet were able to protect occupants in 50 mile-per-hour frontal crashes. See
McGinley, Gas Savings vs. Safety Stirs Debate, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1990, at B1, col. 1.
57. See, e.g., Hanna, Don'tMandateHigher-MileageCars,USA Today, Aug. 10, 1990,
at 10A, col. 2.
It is supremely ironic that after doing all it could to keep fuel-efficient automobiles off
the market and out of consumer choice sets for decades, the industry should now defend its
recent resistance to higher fuel-economy standards in the name of promoting consumer
choice. Thus, Thomas Hanna, President of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association,
argues that if higher fuel-economy requirements are enacted, "[m]illlons of Americans
... will have to forego the performance, comfort and utility of the kinds of cars and trucks
most suited to their needs." Id. Obviously, the fact that consumers have for decades been
denied the choice of high fuel-economy cars seems not to concern the industry, which
apparently holds sacrosanct its power to restrict consumer choice.
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C. Automotive Safety
Over the course of the twentieth century, the Office of Technology
Assessment reported in 1979, "approximately two million persons have
died and nearly 100 million have been injured through the use of motor
vehicles-a total that is more than three times the combat losses suffered by
the United States in all wars."58 The average death toll from auto crashes
of 121 people per day is equivalent to the occurrence of a major airline
disaster every day, and imposes an economic burden on the country
estimated at nearly $60 billion per year. 9
Can this carnage be attributed to the exercise of choice by drivers?
Have they knowingly chosen to subject themselves to this kind of bodily
risk? Has the auto oligopoly merely responded to a perverse consumer
preference for life-threatening thrills? Hardly. A more likely explanation
is that the industry for decades has denied consumers the freedom to
choose safer automobiles, simply by refusing to make them available.
Patents awarded the auto giants in the 1920s and 1930s for such safety
features as padded dashboards and collapsible steering columns were
shelved for decades, until their use was mandated by government
decree.' The industry also ignored or dismissed important results of
safety research conducted by others.6 '
As one result, automobiles became progressively more dangerous in
design over the post-World War H era. In a comparative analysis
conducted in 1955, for example, Cornell University researchers found that
"when injury producing accidents occur, occupants of 1950-54 cars are
injured more often than occupants of 1940-49 cars. Further, there is a
statistically significant increase in the frequency of fatality among the
occupants of 'newer' cars."62 A little over a decade later, the Senate
Commerce Committee
was presented with graphic evidence that the interior design of
many 1966 model cars reveal interiors bristling with rigid tubes,

58.

OFIcE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, CHANGES IN THE FUTURE

USE AND CHARAcTERuSTiCS OFTHE AUTOMOBmE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (1979),
in D. BO IER & . CLAYBROOK, FREEDOM FROM HARM 65 (1986).

59. D.

BOLLIMR & J. CLAYBROOK,

quoted

supra note 58, at 65-66.

60. See Federal Role in Traffic Safety: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Executive
Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
3, at 1319-21 (1966) [hereinafter Federal Role in Traffic Safety Hearings]; see also R.
NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SpEm 92-93 (1965) (discussing the industry's shelving of safetyenhancing patents).
61. See R. NADER, supra note 60, at 143.
62. Id at 134.
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angles, knobs, sharp instruments, and heavy metal of small radius
of curvature.... The committee was likewise made aware of the
substantial needless hazards to pedestrians presented by external
protrusions, sharp edges, stylistically angled
fins, ornamental
63
bumpers.
Throughout this period, the oligopoly insisted that safety should be
optional, supplied only in response to consumer demand and preference (or
the lack thereof)." Yet the Big Three steadfastly refused to release the
safety information essential to informed, rational consumer decision
making:
The industry has actively cultivated a consumer ignorance about
safety by promoting a concept of an automobile that stressed style,
ride, and performance. While eager to tell the potential consumer
about the rated horsepower, acceleration capability and kinds of
interior decor, the automaker will not tell him, even if he demands
it, such important facts about the safety of the cars as: brake
stopping ability, tire skid and blowout resistance, roof collapse
strength, door latch and door hinge strength, the dash panel's and
windshield's cushioning ability, the amount of rearward
displacement of the steering wheel and shaft under a forward
crash into a fixed barrier, the side and roof crash resistance of the
vehicle and the seat anchorage strength. These technical values
can all be given in quite precise terms against expressed
criteria.'

Instead, the oligopoly has expended enormous sums to extol raw power
and rocket acceleration, and then traditionally retreated behind its plea that
"safety doesn't sell," despite considerable evidence to the contrary. For
example, in his study of the industry in the early 1970s, John Jerome found

that Ford could not meet the unexpectedly strong consumer demand for the
safety package it offered as an option in its 1956 model line.6 Yet, Ford

63. SENATE COMW. ON COMMERCE, NATIONAL TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
Acr OF 1966, S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2709, 2711.
64. See R. NADER, supra note 60, at 250-51.
65. FederalRole in Traffic Safety Hearings,supra note 60, at 1279.
66. J.JEROME, THE DEATH OF THE AUTOMOBILE 273 (1972). As explained in a 1956
press release issued by the Ford Motor Company:
Since two of the five [safety] features--crash padding and seat belts-were optional
with the customer, it was possible to measure demand by totaling up the number
sold. The demand surprised even the optimistic Ford staff. No optional feature

956,
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abruptly dropped the safety package in the same year it was
offered-perhaps, some suggest, -because of pressure exerted on it by
GM.' Ford also remained silent after discovering (through its own
internal testing) the dangerous design of GM's infamous Corvair, a
reticence that seems to have been motivated in part by Ford's desire to
maintain cordial relations with its fellow ollgopolist."
The market power of the Big Three to restrict consumer choice, and
to manipulate the allocation of resources, is particularly clear in the case
of the industry's decades-long battle against the air bag. Despite estimates
that air bags can save thousands of lives annually, and that they can
prevent hundreds of thousands of serious injuries, GM, according to a
Senior Vice-President of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (HHS),
"pursued a policy of withholding that technology from the public,
encouraging delay of federal passive restraint requirements, and
discouraging consumer interest in the handful of air bag-equipped cars it
produced in the mid-1970s."' GM persistently refused to publicize air
bags despite its own surveys (subsequently suppressed for eight years)
revealing that forty to fifty percent of GM's customers would be willing
to pay "a significant amount" for air-bag protection; despite a 1985 IIHS
poll revealing that over half (fifty-two percent) of those polled were in
favor of "requiring car manufacturers to equip new cars with airbags even
if airbags cost $350";7" and despite the conclusion of two former GM
officials that air bags for front-seat occupants would cost only $148 per
car, rather than the far higher costs decried by the industry." In fact, in
a 1976 front-page expos6, the Wall Street Journal disclosed that air bags
"received no wholehearted promotion" by GM and, further, that "the
company and its dealers actively discouraged [air bag] sales."72

in Ford history caught on so fast in the first year.
D. BOLLIER & J. CLAYBROOK, supranote 58, at 67. Ford officials estimated that the safety
package boosted the firm's annual sales by approximately 200,000 automobiles. Id at 68.
67. See L. IAcoccA, TACOCCA 296 (1984).
68. See E. CRAY, supra note 54, at 409.
69. Motor Vehicle Safety and the Marketplace: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Surface Transportationof the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1983) [hereinafter Motor Vehicle Safety Hearings] (statement of
Ben Kelley, Senior Vice-President, IIHS).
70. Airbags & Seatbelts ... Why Not Both?, AIDE: THE MAGAZINE FROM USAA,
Summer 1985, at 10, 13-14 [hereinafter Airbags & Seatbelts].
71. Motor Vehicle Safety Hearings, supra note 69, at 71-76; see also Airbags &
Seatbelts, supra note 70, at 14 (discussing cost of air bags and the development of a new

system estimated to cost under $100).
72. Karr, Saga of the Air Bag, Or the Slow Deflation of a Car-Safety Idea, Wall St.
J., Nov. 11, 1976, at Al, col. 4 (emphasis added). GM's behavior in this regard has not
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Reviewing the record in 1983, the Supreme Court sharply castigated the
industry for having "waged the moral equivalent of war against air
bags." 7 Only last year did GM finally announce that by 1995 a driver'sside air bag will be standard equipment in every car it builds in the United
States.74
Here again, the industry's concentrated market structure, and the
anticompetitive concern for group protection that it fosters, has afforded
the oligopoly the power to restrict consumer choice by collectively
withholding product options from the market. The phenomenon is neither
new nor surprising. It was elucidated long ago by GM President Alfred
Sloan, when he confided:
I feel that General Motors should not adopt safety glass for its
cars ....I can only see competition being forced into the same
position. Our gain would be purely a temporary one and the net
result would be that both competition and ourselves would have
reduced the return on our capital and the public would have
obtained still more value per dollar expended.75
Freedom of choice? Consumer welfare? Allocative efficiency? Only the
Theater of the Absurd would countenance such abuse of language and
distortion of meaning.
D. Automotive Smog Pollution
By the early 1960s, the typical American automobile spewed
approximately one ton of pollutants per year into the nation's atmosphere,
and motor vehicles accounted for an estimated sixty percent of all air
pollution.76 Initially an acute problem in southern California, automotive
air pollution soon reached epidemic proportions in every major
metropolitan region of the nation.' Here again, the auto oligopoly's

been unique. As one frustrated consumer recently characterized it, "tirying to get an air bag
out of Ford is like trying to get a pearl out of a lockjawed oyster." Karr & McGinley, Auto
Shoppers Encounter Stiff Resistance When Seeking Air Bags at FordDealers,Wall St. J.,
July 31, 1986, at B27, col. 3.
73. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 49

(1983).
74. Myerson, A Boostfor the Air Bag, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1990, § 3, at 2, col. 3.

75. Planning,Regulation and Competition:Automobile Industry-1968:HearingsBefore
the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 967 (1968) (statement of
Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., President, General Motors Corp.).
76. L. WHITE, THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY SINCE 1945, at 228-29 (1971).

77. See generallyMESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING
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performance has been conducive neither to consumer welfare nor to
achieving an efficient allocation of resources.
At first, the industry simply denied the existence of the
problem-human sensory perceptions and the industry's own internal
research findings to the contrary notwithstanding." "Waste vapors are
dissipated in the atmosphere quickly and do not present an air-pollution
problem," Ford assured Los Angeles County supervisors in 1953."9 "The
powerplants which modem-day engineers design do not
fine automotive
,, 8

'smoke.

" 0

Later, as the pollution problem worsened and national concern rose,
the Big Three forged a cartel to eliminate rivalry among themselves in the
development of automotive pollution-control technology, and to prevent it
from reaching the market. In an antitrust suit filed in 1969 (which the
industry did not contest), the Justice Department found that the auto giants
"conspired not to compete in research, development, manufacture, and
installation of [automotive pollution] control devices, and did all in their
power to delay such research, development, manufacturing, and
installation."81 The Justice Department found that the Big Three ignored
promising inventions, refused to purchase pollution-control technologies
developed by others, delayed installing smog controls already available and
known to them, and at times disciplined members of the cartel whose

Am POLLUTiON, H.R. Doc. No. 47, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-3 (1967) (air pollution having
health effects in both large and small cities); H.R. REP. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1967) (finding that no major metropolitan area in the United States lacked an air pollution
problem); S. REP.No. 403,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967) (finding air pollution a problem
not only in large urban areas, but in smaller communities as well); H.R. REP.No. 916, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967) (conference report on the Air Quality Act of 1967, finding that
most of the nation's population is located in expanding urban areas suffering from a growth
in the amount and complexity of air pollution).
78. "GM has been cognizant of the exhaust gas problem for many years," the firm's
Administrative Director John M. Campbell stated in 1953, "and the research laboratories of
GM have been responsible for the discovery of much of the basic information on exhaust
gas that is available today on this subject." Automotive Research and Development
Hearings,supranote 53, at 619. Internal memoranda suggest that GM had been sufficiently
concerned about the automotive air pollution problem to begin researching it at least as early
as 1938. See 117 CONG. REC. 15,626-27 (1971) (remarks concerning smog control antitrust
case "brought against American auto manufacturers for conspiring to retard the development
of a smog-free vehicle").
79. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm.
on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 158 (1967) (statement of Dan J.Chabek,
News Department, Ford Motor Co.).
80. 1,
81. 117 CONG. REc. 15,627 (1971) (remarks on smog control antitrust case against auto
manufacturers).
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adherence to the collective suppression effort might temporarily waiver.
"Since the industry was fortified from the beginning of the program with
the agreement among its members not to take competitive advantage over
each other," the Justice Department concluded, "all auto manufacturers
were able through the years to stall, delay, impede and retard research,
development, production
and installation of motor vehicle air pollution
82
control equipment."
E. Summary
Thus, an empirical analysis highlights the central flaws of the New
Learning. It shows that market power includes the discretionary power to
control the choices from which consumers are permitted to select, and the
power to thereby control the allocation of society's scarce resources in
accordance with producer-rather than consumer-preferences. Contrary to
New Learning claims, the outcome seldom promotes social optimality.
The auto oligopoly maneuvered to eliminate mass transportation as a
viable option in order to force consumer "preference" for private
automobiles. It resisted providing smaller, more fuel-efficient automobiles
in order to force consumer "preference" for large gas-guzzlers. It had the
power to ignore consumer preferences and refuse to make safer cars
available, or to deign to make them available (as it began to do in 19891990) 83 -but at its own discretion and at a time of its own choosing, rather
than in response to consumer preference. In addition, the Big Three were
able to withhold less-polluting automobiles' from the market in order to tilt
consumer "preference" toward the smog-producing models that the
oligopoly preferred to provide.
However, the market power of the auto triopoly extends beyond even
this impressive degree of control. For example, when confronted with the
advent of foreign competition and considerable consumer preference for the
offerings of foreign producers, the industry can mobilize its political clout
in order to obtain government restrictions on foreign imports-as it has
successfully done during the 1980s, resulting in artificially inflated new-car
prices.

82.
83.
at B17,
84.

Id. at 15,633.
See, e.g., White, U.S. Auto Makers Decide Safety Sells, Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1988,
col. 3.
Industry experts estimate that 1983 new-car prices (both foreign and domestic) rose

$400 to $1,000 on average as a direct result of the import quotas. Crandall, Import Quotas
and the Automobile Industry: The Costs ofProtectionism,BROOKINGS REV., Summer, 1984,
at 8, 13-15; see also Lehner & Pine, Decision on JapaneseAuto Quotas Will Affect Buyers'
Choices, Costs, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1984, § 2, at 37, col. 4 (discussing the impact of import
quotas on the American auto industry and consumers); Wayne, The Irony and Impact of
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Consumer preference, it seems, is a fine thing-but only so long as
consumers prefer what market power wants them to prefer, and only so
long as their preferences are exercised within the confines of the choices
which market power wants to make available. 5 It is a problem that the
New Learning conspicuously fails to confront.
IV. THE REVISIONIST VIEW: THE "TRADE-OFF" QUESTION
A final argument in the New Learning litany requires attention: the
claim that mergers and concentration may be welfare-enhancing even when
they result in the loss of allocative efficiency. Here the contention is that
a laissez-faire policy toward mergers and concentration is desirable,
because the gains in production and technological efficiency associated
with corporate bigness more than offset the welfare loss associated with a
lessening of competition (and the allocative inefficiency resulting
therefrom)."

Auto Quotas, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1984, § 3, at 1, col. 2 (same). In the aggregate, the cost
to consumers of import restrictions has been estimated at $15.7 billion in artificially inflated
new car prices. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., A REvEw OF REcENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY INCLUDING AN ASSESSMENT OF THE JAPANESE VOLUNTARY
RFSTRANT AGREEMENTS at ix (1985).
For a related analysis of the adverse effects of the industry's pricing power on
macroeconomic stability and the severity of business cycles, see Adams & Brock, Corporate
Power and Economic Sabotage, 20 J. ECON. ISsUES 919, 931-35 (1986).
It also is noteworthy that while the domestic oligopoly has restricted consumers'
freedom to choose foreign cars, the Big Three have defended and freely exercised their own
freedom to procure foreign-produced parts and components. See White, Big Auto Makers
Boosted Parts Imports While Assailing Trade Gap, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1988, at AS, col.
1.
Finally, as an alternative to industry-demanded import quotas, the Big Three can
further remove the threat of foreign competition and wider consumer choice, by linking up
with their major foreign rivals in joint ventures, thereby transmuting their relationship from
one of rivalry to one of global partnership. See generally Adams & Brock, supra note 31,
85. Senator Daniel J. Evans (R., Wash.) identified the precarious place of consumer
preference in the face of this economic and political power. In 1985, in the midst of the
industry's recurring campaign against imports and government fuel-economy standards, he
observed that the auto firms' "response to competition from Japan was to cry out for import
restrictions. Now they are saying let the market decide whether fuel efficiency standards
are required." Schlesinger, Auto Companies' Lobbying DriveAims to Poke Widest Loophole
Yet in U.S. Fuel-Economy Law, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1986, § 2, at 68, col. 1.
Chrysler's recent television advertising campaign, berating consumers for "irrationally"
preferring Japanese imports, affords additional evidence of the industry's attitude toward
consumer "preference." Or as GM's Boss Kettering once put it: "It isn't that we build such
bad cars. It's that they are such lousy customers." B. YATES, supra note 50, at 282.
86. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 11, at 109. "
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Whether or not such a trade-off indeed exists is, of course, a question
that is not susceptible to theoretical resolution. It is an empirical problem
which, strangely enough, the New Learning protagonists refuse to confront.
Although they make "efficient" performance the centerpiece of their
public-policy position, they concede that such performance is difficult, if
not impossible, to measure scientifically. Bork, for example, states that
the real objection to performance tests and efficiency defenses in
antitrust law is that they are spurious. They cannot measure the
factors relevant to consumer welfare, so that after the economic
extravaganza was completed we should know no more than before
it began. In saying this I am taking issue with some highly
qualified authorities.... Their idea, essentially, is that a court or
agency determine, through a litigation process, whether there
exists in a particular industry a persistent divergence between
price and marginal cost; the approximate size of the divergence;
whether breaking up, say, eight firms into sixteen would reduce
or eliminate the divergence; and whether any significant
efficiencies would be destroyed by the dissolution.'
Such empirical inquiry, says Bork, would be both fruitless and
superfluous." Without such an inquiry, however, it should be obvious
that no "correct" public-policy conclusions can be formulated.
Once again, we turn to the automobile industry as a laboratory for
testing the empirically unsubstantiated claims of the New Learning. In this
typical oligopoly, is there a trade-off between concentration and
production/innovation efficiency, on the one hand, and industrial
decentralization and increased competition, on the other? Are the size and
market power of the Big Three the inevitable response to the technological
imperatives of a modem industrial economy? Is oligopoloid giantism
essential in order to enable ever-better automobiles to be produced at everlower cost? Do corporate bigness and market control thus constitute the
price that society must pay for a world-class automobile industry? The
empirical evidence indicates otherwise.
A. ProductionEfficiency
Rather than a sleek engine of production efficiency, the American auto
oligopoly has long exhibited the debilities and diseconomies of excessive
organizational size, and the bureaucratic bloat that accompanies it. Six

87. Id at 124-125.
88. See id at 129 ("performance tests and efficiency tests would multiply the costs of
antitrust enforcement and defense without conferring any compensating advantage").
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decades ago, GM Chairman Alfred Sloan bemoaned the production
inefficiencies of GM's size:
In practically all our activities we seem to suffer from the inertia
resulting from our great size. It seems to be hard for us to get
action when it comes to a matter of putting our ideas across.
There are so many people involved and it requires such a
tremendous effort to put something new into effect that a new idea
is likely to be considered insignificant in comparison with the
effort that it takes to put it across.... I can't help but feel that
General Motors has missed a lot by reason of this inertia....
Sometimes I am almost forced to the conclusion that General
Motors is so large and its inertia so great that it is impossible for
us to be leaders.8 9
In a candid moment, former GM President Pete Estes later corroborated
this conclusion: "Chevrolet is such a big monster that you twist its tail and
nothing happens at the other end for months and months. It is so gigantic
that there isn't any way to really run it. You just sort of try to keep track
of it.'
The problem persists in the present day. Although GM is by far the
world's largest automobile producer, with dollar sales equal to those of the
three largest Japanese auto producers combined,91 it suffers the highest
per-unit production cost disadvantage in the industry, a disadvantage
variously estimated at $200-$800 per car.' By the early 1980s, the
American oligopoly's production costs exceeded those of its smaller
Japanese rivals by an estimated $1,700 per car, with the bulk of the
difference due to inefficient management and organization, rather than
"slave" wages paid abroad.93 After reviewing the Big Three's efforts

89. TEMPORARY

NAT'L

EcoN.

COMM.,

U.S.

CONG.,

INVESTIGATION

OF

CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC PoWER, MONOGRAPH No. 13, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 130-31

(1941).
90. J. WRIGHT, ON A CLEAR DAY You CAN SEE GENERAL MOTORS 100 (1979).

91. See Vella, Auto Scoreboard,Bus. WK., May 7, 1990, at 54.
92. See HARBOUR & Assocs., THE HARBOUR REPORT: A DECADE LATER 142 (1990);
M. KELLER, RUDE AWAKENING: THE RISE, FALL, AND STRUGGLE FOR RECOVERY OF

GENERAL MOTORS 83, 178 (1989); Fisher, GMIs TougherThan You Think, FORTUNE, Nov.
10, 1986, at 56; Taylor, The New Drive to Revive GM, FORTUNE, Apr. 9, 1990, at 53;
Kurtzman, Prospects: What's Next for G.M., N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
93. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 15 (1982). Following
their on-site investigation of Japanese automobile production, one team of researchers
reported that
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during the 1980s to improve their manufacturing efficiency, automotive

analyst James Harbour found that
none of the [Big Three] plants use their labor and machinery as
effectively as the Japanese. Die changes still require six to ten
times longer on average, downtime is more frequent, scrap is
higher, and inventory is larger. Big Three manufacturers still use
more presses, larger plants, more labor, more dies, and more
production time to produce a comparable set of steel body panels

for a car.94

Vertical integration in parts and components production in the industry
generally, and at GM in particular, further exacerbates production
inefficiency, and additionally inflates production costs.95 Finally, despite
their size and decades-long domination of the field, the Big Three's
productivity significantly trails that of their Japanese rivals,' with GM's
productivity ranking the worst among the Big Three, and continuing to
suffer despite plant investments of billions of dollars during the 1980s.' 7
the Japanese showed themselves to be doggedly persistent in their efforts to
master operational detail. We had been half-prepared to find them using process
technology far more advanced than anything available to the American
counterparts. What we saw about us at every turn, however, was not newer
technology but better management of the technology in place-not the exotic
gimmickry of wide-eyed public expectation but a sober mastery of manufacturing.
W. ABERNATHY, K. CLARK & A. KA.4TROW, INDusTRL RENmSSANCE 76 (1983).
94. HARBOUR & Assocs., supra note 92, at 221.
95. See Puncturedby Perot,ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 1986, at 15; Survival of the Fattest,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1985, at 35; Holusha, G.M. 's President Outlines a Strategy, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 2, 1987, at Dl, col 3; Levin, Groping Giant, Wall St. J., July 22, 1986, at Al,
col. 6.
96. Stokes, Auto Glut, 21 NAT'L J. 2310, 2313 (1989). In 1983, relative productivity
among U.S. and Japanese automotive firms was as follows:
Vehicles Produced
CPer
Worker
GM
11
Ford
15
Chrysler
16
Nissan
42
Toyota
58
See Adams & Brock, supra note 26, at 118.
97. Of General Motors, James Harbour reports: "Labor productivity improvement in
assembly, stamping and powertrain during the 1980s was negligible. The performance of
new and modernized assembly plants is pitiable. It boggles the mind when one considers
that GM's new assembly plants are less productive than the old ones they replaced."
HARBOUR & Assocs., supra note 92, at 269.
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B. Technological Innovation
The oligopoly's performance in the area of technological innovation
is no more enviable. With the demise of a vigorous independent sector in
the post-World War II era, and the steady consolidation of the industry into
an ever-tighter oligopoly, the pace of genuine product innovation
slackened. Innovations like front-wheel drive, disc brakes, fuel injection,
four-wheel steering, and fuel economy languished in the hands of the Big
Three. "Since competition within the industry was mild," David
Halberstam explains in his monumental study,
there was no impulse to innovate; to the finance people,
innovation not only was expensive but seemed unnecessary....
Why bother, after all? In America's rush to become a middle-class
society, there was an almost insatiable demand for cars. It was
impossible not to make money, and there was a conviction that no
matter what sales were this year, they would be even greater the
next. So there was little stress on improving the cars. From 1949,
when the automatic transmission was introduced, to the late
seventies, the cars remained remarkably the same. What
innovation there was came almost reluctantly."
The post-World War II era was, according to one former GM executive,
"a quarter-century of technical hibernation"--an era when the domestic
oligopoly "went on a two-decade marketing binge which generally served
up the same old product under the guise of something new and useful."' 9
Thus, while the Big Three luxuriated in a cozy, noncompetitive
domestic milieu, foreign producers took the lead in aggressively exploiting
the frontiers of automotive technology. According to veteran observer
Brock Yates, foreign producers "continued to move ahead with fuel
injection, disc brakes, rack and pinion steering, radial tires, quartz
headlights, stalk-mounted windshield wiper and dimmer controls,
ergonomically adjustable bucket seats, five-speed manual transmissions,
high-efficiency overhead camshaft engines, independently sprung

Contrasting the construction of GM's Saturn plant at Spring Hill, Tennessee, with the

construction of Honda's plant in Marysville, Ohio, the Wall Street Journalpoints out that
"[flor roughly what GM spent at Spring Hill, Honda got not one but two assembly plants

with total annual capacity of 510,000 cars--more than double Saturn's." White & Guiles,
Rough Launch, Wall St. J., July 9, 1990, at Al, col. 6.

98. D. HALBESTAM, THE RECKONING 244-45 (1986).
99. J. WRIGHT, supra note 90, at 4.
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suspensions,
advanced shock absorbers, and strict crash-worthiness
"100

standards.

The Big Three continue to lag behind. Foreign producers, particularly
those in Japan, have recently commercialized such innovations as fourwheel steering and electronically controlled "active" suspensions,100 13
°2
continuously variable automatic transmissions," multivalve engines,
rotationally mounted engine-placement design,"° and ceramic engine
componentry. 1° At the same time, a team of researchers recently found
that the Big Three typically require forty-five percent longer lead times
than their Japanese rivals to bring new projects to market (61.9 versus 42.6
months on average), and that they expend nearly triple the engineering
time in the process."

100. B. YATES, supra note 50, at 149.
101. See Beauchamp, Here They Come Again, FORBES, Feb. 8, 1988, at 76; Hampton,
JustAhead: Four-Wheel Steering, Bus. WK., Sept. 14, 1987, at 160; Schuon, Honda Is First
on the Block to Flaunt4-Wheel Steering, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1987, § 5, at 9, col. 1.
102. By eliminating separate gears, the continuously variable transmission combines
the greater fuel economy of a manual shift with the convenience of an automatic
transmission. See Stertz, Japan's Transmissions Take Technology Lead, Wall St. L,Aug.
3, 1989, at Bi, col. 1; Ingrassia, Subaru Hopes to Get Sales Back into Gearwith Switch to
Unorthodox Transmission, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1988, at B1, col. 3.
103. Advanced multivalve engines are smaller and more compact, bum fuel more
efficiently, and produce more power. But "[wihile Japanese car companies have pushed hard
to bring the multivalve engine to the marketplace, Detroit has lagged." Levin, New Japan
Car War Weapon: "ALittle Engine That Could", N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1989, § 1, at 1, col.
1. A recent study reports that every Honda car sold in the U.S. has multivalve technology,
as do 70% of Toyotas, and 54% of Nissans. Id at 16, col. 1.
104. See Keebler, Toyota Puts a Spin on Previa Engine's Central Placement,
AuTOMoTIvE NEws, June 11, 1990, at 18. On innovation in automobile design more
generally, see Sanger, Japan,Land of Look-Alike Cars, Goes O,%ea4 N.Y. Times, Feb. 13,
1989, at Al, col. 4.
105. Ceramic composite materials are lighter, stronger and better able to withstand high
temperatures than conventional materials. See Naj, U.S. Loses Edge in Composite
Materials,Wall St. L,Dec. 26, 1989, at B2, col. 4.
Robert Frosch, the head of General Motors Corp.'s research labs in Detroit, says
GM has looked at the ceramics technology and isn't "making any major push"
in the area. "We haven't been compelled by anything we see to rush into it.
Maybe one day we'll say cops, but I doubt it".... In Japan-where some years
ago ceramics makers began making fish hooks and chopsticks with the material
in an attempt to gather production experience-Nissan Motor Co. is already selling
cars with ceramic turbo chargers. Toyota Motor Corp. has more than two dozen
ceramics parts in its cars. Isuszu Motors Corp. is testing an all ceramic engine.

Id
106. Clark, Chew & Fujimoto, ProductDevelopment in the World Auto Industry, 3
BROOKINGS PAPERs ON ECONOMIC ACTIvrrY 729, 741 (1987). These statistics can not be
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In reality, then, there is no painful trade-off between market power, on
the one hand, and inferior production efficiency and innovativeness, on the
other. To the contrary, disproportionate size and market power seem to
have undermined economic performance in the industry, as an increasing
number of analysts now recognize." In its recent feature story on GM,
for example, Business Week was compelled to conclude that the "basic
question nagging this biggest, most diverse, and most integrated of car
companies is whether it is just too big to compete in today's fast-changing
car market."1 °8 The conservative London Economist is even more
acerbic. After observing that "GM's committee-designed models are out of
date years before they reach the streets," it offered its blunt
recommendations for newly-appointed GM Chairman Robert Stempel:
To save his firm, Mr. Stempel must break it up. He should sell off
EDS and Hughes Aerospace, the costly high-tech distractions
which have contributed little to cars. He should dismember GM's
car division into two or three independent companies, freeing
them to10 9compete with one another and to handle their own
designs.
Nor can recourse be had to New Learning assertions of survival of the
fittest as an automatic corrective for deficient performance. When
Chrysler-then the nation's tenth largest industrial concern-teetered on the
brink of bankruptcy in 1979-80, primarily as the result of a succession of
improvident managerial decisions, the firm demanded (and obtained) a
government bailout in the form of federal loan guarantees of $1.5 billion
because, Chrysler argued, it was too big to be allowed to fail.110 Chrysler
survived, not because it was better, but because it was bigger-not because
it was fitter, but because it was fatter. The Chrysler bailout obviously
repudiates New Learning claims that only efficient firms survive, that
bigness is proof of social fitness and desirability, and that laissez-faire is
the optimal antitrust policy toward corporate size and mega-mergers.'
interpreted as indicative of superior product design and quality, given the Big Three's
generally poor showing in annual quality rankings of automobiles. See, e.g., HAR3OUR &
Assocs., supra note 92, at 142-44; Stertz, Big Three Boost Car Quality But Still Lag, Wall
St. J., Mar. 27, 1990, at BI, col. 3.
107. For evidence of this trend in American industry generally, see W. ADAMS & J.
BROCK, supra note 11, at 32-64.
108. Hampton & Norman, GeneralMotors: What Went Wrong?, Bus. WK., Mar. 16,
1987, at 102, 110.
109. Detroit Under Siege, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 1990, at 13, 13.
110. See W. ADAMS & L BROCK, supra note 11, at 297-303.
111. For a more general treatment of this problem and its implications, see Adams &
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V. CONCLUSION

The life of the law, Mr. Justice Holmes wrote, is not logic but
experience: "The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only
the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics."11 2 By that test,
the vision of the Sherman Act is as valid today as it was 100 years ago.
Massive empirical evidence indicates that a decentralized power
structure-the root principle of antitrust-does not have to be sacrificed to
attain either allocative efficiency, or efficiency in production and
innovation, or a "Pareto-optimal" maximization of consumer welfare. If
that be so, what justification remains for the toleration of concentrated
economic power or for a policy of untrammeled laissez-faire which would
insulate such power from antitrust challenge?
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